The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation and Challenges
Most of today's market networks support the delivery of a variety of goods to their agents/ individuals. One of the main challenges in market networks is the design of resource allocation strategies which guarantee the delivery of different goods/services and maximize some performance criterion (e.g. the network's utility to its agents/individuals).
The challenge in determining such resource allocation strategies comes from the fact that each agent's utility is its own private information. The network (network manager) is unaware of the agents' utilities. If information were centralized, the resource allocation problem could be formulated and solved as a mathematical programming problem or as a dynamic programming problem. Since information is not centralized such formulations are not possible. The challenge is to determine a decentralized message exchange May 2011 DRAFT process among the agents and an allocation rule (based on the outcome of the message exchange process) that eventually lead to a resource allocation that is optimal for the corresponding centralized problem.
The above considerations have guided most of the research on resource allocation in market networks. Basically, there are two microeconomic approaches have been used for the development of efficient decentralized resource allocation schemes in market networks: resource-oriented and price-oriented [1] .
In the resource-oriented approach, each individual computes the marginal values for his current resources, and communicates them to the rest of the agents. The allocation is then changed so that agents with an above average marginal utility receive more of this resource and agents with a below average marginal utility receive less. This approach has been used in [2] to develop decentralized algorithms for optimally allocating a single resource to a set of interconnected computing individuals. In the price-oriented approach, an initial allocation of resources is made and an arbitrary set of systemwide initial resource prices is chosen. Prices then are iteratively changed to accommodate the demands for resources until the total demand for a resource exactly equals the total amount available. Most of the results on decentralized resource allocation currently available in the literature are based on the price-oriented approach [3] - [18] . In this paper, since we follow the price-oriented approach to resource allocation, we critically review the results reported in [3] - [18] so that we can point out to the contributions of our work.
The work currently available on decentralized resource allocation by price-oriented methods has addressed, either by analysis [5] - [7] , [10] - [17] , or simulation and analysis [3] , [7] - [9] , [12] . A significant number of publications have dealt with single good [6] - [9] , [16] , or with the allocation of a single resource per connection [4] - [14] .
In several papers [5] - [7] , [15] - [17] the following general philosophy to resource allocation by price-oriented methods has been adopted: (1) formulate a centralized constrained optimization problem where the objective is the maximization of a social welfare function and the constraints are imposed by the availability of network resources; and (2) use pricing methods to devise a decentralized scheme that realizes the solution of the centralized problem and satisfies the informational constraints imposed by the network.
The existence of a solution to the centralized problem is shown, and market methods are used to structure and develop the solution. The existence of a set of prices that induce agents to request the optimal allocation is established and, in some cases [6] , [12] , [15] - [17] an iterative scheme for adjusting the prices based on the agent's requests is described. However, none of the papers specify a mechanism to force the successive prices to converge to the optimal set of prices.
Furthermore, in all of the aforementioned papers it is assumed that individuals/agents act as if their behavior has no effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the market/message allocation process. In other words, there is an auctioneer/network manager who updates the prices according to the excess demand while the agents update their demands based on the prices (i.e. the network periodically adjusts the prices based on the monitored agent request for resources).
In this paper, we follow the price-oriented approach and the philosophy presented in the previous paragraph, to address the resource allocation problem in market networks.
Our formulation of the resource allocation problem captures the issues and considerations discussed in the first paragraph of this section. In particular, we consider a connection-oriented network that can potentially offer multiple services/goods to individuals. agents' preferences are summarized by means of their utility functions, and each agent is allowed to request more than one type of service/good. No assumption is made on the functional form of the utility functions, although some mild regularity conditions are imposed (see Section II). We assume that the relation between the availability of goods and resource allocation is given (see discussion in Section II), and we incorporate it as a constraint into a static optimization problem (the centralized problem). The objective of the optimization problem is to determine the amount and, required resources for each type of service/good to maximize the sum of the agents May 2011 DRAFT utilities. We prove the existence of a solution of the optimization problem, and describe a competitive market economy that implements the solution and satisfies the informational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation problem. In particular, in contrast to other papers that follow the philosophy of priceoriented method we assume individuals/agents act as if their behavior has a direct effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the market allocation process, we justify it in Section I-B, due to this relaxation agents in market networks called non-price taking.
This relaxation is justified in fully decentralized networks/systems in which there is no auctioneer (equivalently the designer is purely wealth redistributionary, see Section II)
to set the price and thus, due to the nature of the market problems [29] , individuals should converge, via a decentralized message exchange process, to the same price in a distributed manner. A philosophy similar to ours with different objectives for the public good problem has also been adopted in [19] .
B. Contribution of the paper
The contributions of this paper are: To the best of our knowledge, none of the decentralized resource allocation mechanisms proposed so far for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints possesses simultaneously properties (P1-P3) with general concave utility functions and non-pricetaking agents.
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C. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we formulate the centralized problem with non-price-taking agents. In section III we describe the elements of the mechanism we propose for achieving a solution of the centralized problem. In section IV we analyze the properties of the proposed mechanism. We conclude in section V.
II. MODEL AND OBJECTIVES
A. General Model
In this problem, we have m non-price-taking agents and the set of agents is A = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Suppose there are n goods which are each infinitely divisible; let L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n } be the set of goods. There is only a limited amount of each good; the maximum amount of l j available is denoted by c l j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and is always nonnegative. Consider a specific agent i.
of goods which may be requested by agent i. For each agent, the subset L i is known and fixed in advance. The amount of goods actually demanded by the agent is given by the demand vector
, where x i,k is the amount of good l i,k requested by i, for k = 1, 2, . . . , |L i |. For a given demand x i , the utility to agent i is the
which is differentiable, concave, and satisfies U i (0) = 0 and U i (z) = −∞ if any entry of z is negative. Also, call x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) to be the overall demand of all agents. Furthermore, let A l ⊆ A be the set of agents who may request good l; i.e., A l = {i : l ∈ L i } 1 . Let us denote by −i to be the set of agents who are not i; i.e., −i = A \ {i}. Then we can call
Suppose that we have a designer (e.g., network manager) who wants to design a mechanism to maximize the social welfare
consist of taxation policies on agents i, i = 1, . . . , m, and is to be designed. We consider a scenario where the role of the designer is purely wealth redistributionary; there is no net tax collected, so
Then, we can write the tax-explicit social welfare 1 We assume |A l | > 2, ∀l ∈ L maximization problem, that we call it Max1, as the following:
where the optimization variables are x i ∈ R |L i | for all i ∈ A. The resulting taxes charged to (or accrued by) the agents are denoted by the vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m ), with t i being shorthand for t i (x i ).
B. The decentralized problem and the Objective
We consider the model of the previous subsection with the following assumptions on its information structure.
(A1) Each agent only knows his own utility; this utility is his own private information.
(A2) There is no auctioneer to set/adjust the price (price vector) per unit of service/good(s).
(A3) Agents talk to each other in a broadcast setting, i.e., each agent hears every other agent's message. Therefore, agent i does not need to be aware of A
From the above description it is clear that the information in the network is decentralized.
Under the above assumptions the objective is to determine a mechanism which has the following properties:
(P1) The mechanism is individually rational (the agents voluntarily participate in the mechanism).
(P2) The mechanism is balanced budget at every allocation.
(P3) The mechanism converges to an optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem Max1. 
III. A MECHANISM FOR ALLOCATING DIVISIBLE GOODS
A. The components of the mechanism
A mechanism is described by (M, f ), where M = × m i=1 M i is the message space, specifying for each agent i, i ∈ A, the set of messages M i that agent i uses to communicate to other agents, and f is an outcome function that describes the actions that are taken for every m := (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m m ) ∈ M. The mechanism (M, f ) is common knowledge among the agents.
For the decentralized resource allocation problem formulated in section II we propose a mechanism the components of which we describe below.
Message space: The message space for agent i, i ∈ A, is given by M i ⊂ R 
denotes the price that agent i is willing to pay for the unit of good l.
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Outcome Function: At any time slot n, n = 1, 2, · · · , the outcome function f is given by
and is defined as follows. For any
where at any time n, n = 1, 2, ..., (superscript (n) denotes time slot n) x
is the amount of good l allocated to agent i, and
i ∈ A (t i,l is the tax (subsidy) agent i pays (receives) for good l, l ∈ L i ). We proceed now to specify t
where γ is fixed and sufficiently large,
where ǫ is bigger than zero and sufficiently small, 2 and
2 Therefore, when A and B (both) hold, then 
Next we specify additional subsidies Q i that agent i, i ∈ A, may receive. For that matter we consider all goods l ∈ L such that |A l | = 3. For each good l, with |A l | = 3 we define the
where (a) follows since γ is chosen sufficiently large.
Furthermore for each good l ∈ L where |A l | = 3 an agent k l ∈ A l is chosen, randomly, to assign the subsidy Q (n) {l:|A l |=3} . Let l 1 , l 2 , · · · , l r be the set of goods such that |A l i | = 3, i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , r, be the corresponding agents that receive Q (n) {l:|A l |=3} . Based on the above, the tax (subsidy) paid (received) by agent j, j ∈ A, is the following.
where Q (n)
{l:|A l |=3} is defined by (12) .
Note that Q (n)
{l i :|A l i |=3} does not depend on agent k l i 's message. Thus, the presence (or absence) of Q (n) {l i :|A l i |=3} does not influence the strategic behavior of agent k l i . We have assumed here that the agents k l 1 , k l 2 , · · · , k lr , are distinct. Expressions similar to the above hold when the agents k l 1 , k l 2 , · · · , k lr are not distinct. 
B. The dynamic of the mechanism
The dynamic of the mechanism is as follows. Note that (x (1) , p (1) ) is given, arbitrary, and feasible.
• At time n ≥ 1: every agent i, i ∈ A solves and reports
where
May 2011 DRAFT and φ
(n)
i,l is defined as (11) . Before proceeding further we define some notations and concepts. In other words, budget-balance means that the sum of taxes paid by some of the agents is equal to the sum of the money (subsidies) received by the rest of the agents participating in the allocation process. Budget balance implies that there is no money left unallocated at the end of the allocation.
Definition 2 (Stationary profile (SP)). A message profile
M, is called stationary profile if for any i, i ∈ A,
In the other words, a stationary profile is a message profile that unilateral deviation is not profitable for any agents 3 .
Definition 3 (Individual rationality). A message profile
is weakly preferred by all agents to the initial allocation (0, 0) if
A mechanism is called Individually rational if the above property is satisfied at any stationary profile, that is, agents are incentivized to participate voluntarily in the mechanism.
In other words, Individual rationality asserts that at any stationary profile the utility of each user is at least as much as its utility before participating in the mechanism.
C. Interpretation of the mechanism
It observes that the designer of the mechanism can not alter the agents' utility functions, that is U i , i ∈ A, is agent i ′ s private information. Therefore, the only way to achieve the optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem is through the use of appropriate tax functions/incentive. For each good, the tax functions of our mechanism consists of three components Υ
and Υ (n) 3 , at each time slot n. We specify and interpret these components in the following.
At each time slot n, n = 1, 2, · · · , equation (2) can be decomposed as follows,
specifies the amount agent i has to pay for good l, l ∈ L i . It is important to note that the price per unit of a good that agent i pays is determined by the message/proposal of the other agents requesting the same good. Thus, agent i does not control the price it pays or receives.
• Υ (n) 2 provides the following incentives to the agents, i, i ∈ A l : (1) To bid/propose the same price per unit of good l, l ∈ L. (2) To collectively request a total request for the good does not exceed the available capacity of the good. The incentive provided to all agents to bid the same price per unit of good l is captured by the
The incentive provided to all agents to collectively request a total request that does not exceed the available capacity is imposed by the term
Note that an agent is very heavily (infinitely) penalized if it requests a nonzero amount of a good, and, collectively, all the agents of the good request a total that exceeds the available capacity. A joint incentive provided to all agents to bid the same price per unit of good and to utilize the total capacity of the good is captured by the term
3 , the goal of this component is to lead to a balanced budget. Further, it is important to note that Υ (n) 3
is not controlled by the agent i's message, thus, it does not influence over its behavior.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
In this section we prove that the mechanism proposed in Section III has the following properties: It is individually rational. It is budget-balanced at every feasible allocation.
It converges to an optimal solution of the centralized problem Max1.
We establish the above properties by proceeding as follows. First we show some properties of a stationary profile of the mechanism, Lemma 1. Then, we show that agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process. We do this by showing that the allocations they receive at all efficient stationary profile of the mechanism is weakly preferred to the (0, 0) allocation they receive when they do not participate in the mechanism, Theorem 2. Afterwards, we establish that the mechanism is budget-balanced at all feasible allocations, Lemma 3. Finally, we show that the mechanism converges to an optimal solution of the centralized allocation problem Max1, Theorem 4.
We present the proofs of the following theorems and lemmas in Appendix.
The following lemma presents some key properties of a stationary profile.
Lemma 1.
Let m * = (x * , p * ) be a stationary profile. Then for every l ∈ L and i ∈ A l , we have,
In the rest of the paper, we restrict our attention to the class of stationary profiles defined as follows. 
The following theorem shows that the mechanism proposed in Section III is individually rational, i.e., agents voluntarily participate in the mechanism. By the following theorem, we show that, along the allocation process, the sum of taxes paid by some of the agents is always equal to the sum of the money (subsidies)
received by the rest of the agents participating in the allocation process.
Theorem 3. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced at every feasible allocation.
That is, the mechanism is budget-balanced at all allocations.
Finally, we show that the mechanism converges to an allocation corresponding to a solution of the centralized allocation problem Max1. 
Now, Let m * be a stationary profile, then
Equation (25) implies that
where κ (SP ) means at the stationary profile m * . Taking a sum over all i, i ∈ A l , and using the fact that i∈A l (p *
Therefore, for every i,
Substituting (27) in (26) gives
and consequently,
Equation (24) together with (29) and form of the tax (Eq. (2)) imply that
Proof of Theorem 2:
As it is pointed out in section II, for simplicity we assume for every i, i ∈ A, U i (0) = 0, and initial endowment of each agent is zero. Let m * = (x * , t * )
be a stationary profile then we have
Thus, it is enough to find
To do so, choose
and for any l, l ∈ L i , choose p i,l = η i,l ,
where η i,l is the positive root of the following quadratic polynomial with respect to p i,l ,
Therefore, choosing
Consequently,
Proof of Theorem 3: We want to show that i,i∈A t i = l,l∈L i,i∈A l t i,l = 0. To prove this, we show that i,i∈A l t i,l = 0 for any l, l ∈ L. By a little algebra we can show the following equalities,
Therefore, from Eqs. (38)- (44) we obtain that for any l, l ∈ L, i,i∈A l t i,l = 0 because,
Proof of Theorem 4: By rearranging (15) we have the following,
To prove the convergence, first we state and prove some Lemmas we need to prove the theorem. Lemma 6. The following holds for any t, t ∈ N, i, i ∈ A and l, l ∈ L
for any p ∈ ∆ 4 .
4 ∆, ∆ ⊂ R |L| is a bounded convex set that every bundle of the prices can be chosen from it Furthermore, due to the convexity of | · | 2 , observes that Since for any i, i ∈ A, Υ i (p i ) is affine in p i , thus
subsequently, n−1 t=0 i∈A
Substituting (58) in (56) and dividing by κ (n) result in
Since ∆ is a bounded set and lim n→∞ κ (n) = ∞, thus
Similarly,
Consequently, using (60),(61) and (62) in (59) and the fact that Υ i (p i ) for any i, i ∈ A, is bounded, the proof of the lemma is complete, i.e., there exists Λ 1 such that
Lemma 8. For any i, i ∈ A, we have
